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PROFESSOR ALAN R. BROMBERG'S

RULE 10b-5
Marc L Steinberg*
I was ProfessorAlan Bromberg's colleaguefor 25 years. On several occasions, I raised the subject that the SMU Law Review should publish a Symposium Issue in his honor. He always said "no" and did so in a quick and
emphatic manner. I remember the last time that I raised this subject with
Alan was the only occasion that I believe he became angry with me.

J

am delighted that the SMU Law Review is publishing this wonderful
Symposium Issue in honor of Professor Bromberg. I regret that this
Issue was not published during his lifetime. Nonetheless, I am
pleased that we are honoring Alan in this very well deserved manner. I
thank the Law Review and the authors for this Issue, all of whom are
outstanding academicians, who have contributed to make this worthwhile
project a huge success.
I was sitting in my office at the University of Maryland School of Law
in the fall of 1987 when the telephone rang. Alan Bromberg was calling to
invite me to interview for the Radford Chair at SMU. Having never lived
in Texas or in any other locale in the South and not knowing much about
SMU at the time, I accepted the opportunity. After all, if Alan Bromberg
(one of the premier academicians in financial law) elected to be at SMU,
that law school must have many outstanding attributes.
After a visiting appointment in fall 1988, I joined the SMU law faculty
for the 1989-90 academic year. The over 25 years that have elapsed since
then have been rewarding from both a personal and professional perspective. This is due in significant part to having Alan Bromberg as my valued
colleague and good friend. Through both tranquil and more challenging
times, Alan was a steady presence who consistently provided keen insights. I miss Alan very much. He was a truly kind, brilliant, and remarkable individual.
Alan Bromberg's scholarly achievements were impressive. In 1968, he
authored the seminal treatise, Crane and Bromberg on Partnership Law.1
That treatise subsequently was revised and expanded (with his coauthor
Professor Larry Ribstein) to a multi-volume work that is viewed as the
2
premier scholarly source on the law of partnership.
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP (West Publishing Co. 1968).
2. ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP (Little Brown & Co. 1988) (Aspen Law & Business 1994) (periodically updated).
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As impressive as the partnership treatise is, it was not, at least in my
opinion, Alan's favorite academic endeavor. That achievement is found in
Professor Bromberg's seminal treatise on SEC Rule 10b-5. That treatise,4
first authored in 1967, 3 and now expanded into an eight volume work,
clearly is the preeminent source on the law of securities fraud-and specifically-Rule 10b-5.5 Through the decades, Alan toiled tirelessly on this
treatise, being in his office well after midnight several days weekly-analyzing a recent court decision, SEC pronouncement, or federal statute.
His "passion" for this seemingly endless demanding project was seen by
his continual and vigorous scholarly regimen-arriving at his office by
9:30 staying until 5:00 (without a lunch break), returning after dinner at
7:00 and working frequently past midnight. Alan's Texas license plate said
it all: the letter and numbers are "10B-5"!
Some of my more memorable securities law discussions with Alan occurred in his office shortly after a Supreme Court decision was handed
down. All too often we lamented the unduly narrow approach that the
Court had adopted, further confining the scope of the federal securities
laws, and, in particular, Rule 10b-5. Alan was no plaintiff's lawyer. Indeed, he served as of counsel for over 30 years to Jenkens & Gilchrist and
thereafter to Hunton & Williams. From my perspective, he believed that
an appropriate balance should be struck between the ability of investors
to pursue meritorious litigation and deterring the filing of vexatious lawsuits initiated primarily for their "strike suit" settlement impact.
Professor Bromberg's perspective on Rule 10b-5 likely was impacted
by the state of the federal securities laws at the time he authored his
treatise in 1967. For illustrative purposes, three Supreme Court decisions
provide guidance. The first, Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J.
Howey Co.,6 decided in 1946, expansively interpreted the term "investment contract" (within the definition of "security") to encompass the sale
of citrus groves coupled with a service contract for cultivating and marketing the produce. 7 In its holding, the Court, recognizing that a broad
construction was consistent with the remedial intent of the federal securities laws, held that the term investment contract encompasses "a flexible
3. ALAN R. BROMBERG,
Professor Bromberg's treatise
4. ALAN R. BROMBERO,
BERG AND LowENFELs ON
BROMBERG].

SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD: RULE 10B-5 (McGraw Hill 1967).
was reviewed in 77 YALE L.J. 1585 (1968).
LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, AND MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, BROMSECURITIES FRAUD (2d ed. West 2012) [hereinafter

5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
6. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
7. Id. at 301 (defining the term investment contract to mean "an investment of money
in a common enterprise with profit to come solely from the efforts of others"). Subsequently, this test has been refined by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Steinhardt Grp.,
Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding limited partner interest not a
security where "the limited partner retained pervasive control over its investment in the
limited partnership such that it cannot be deemed a passive investor under Howey and its
progeny"); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating
that the key inquiry is "whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or
success of the enterprise").
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rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet
the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of
'8
the money of others on the promise of profits."
The second decision, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston
Purina Co., 9 decided in 1953, interpreted the parameters of the Section
4(2) (now Section 4(a)(2)) private offering exemption in an investorfriendly manner. 10 That exemption's availability, the Court held, turns
upon "whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the [Securities] Act."'" Analyzing this inquiry, the Court focused
on the subject investor (or such investor's representative) having the requisite financial sophistication and the receipt of (or access to) the type of
information that would be provided in a Securities Act registration statement. 12 In construing the contours of this exemption, the Court's emphasis was directed at whether the subject investor had the necessary
information and sophistication to fend for himself, thereby negating the
3
need for registration.'
From a securities litigation perspective, the third decision, J.L Case v.
Borak, 14 decided in 1964, evidenced the Supreme Court's activist approach in seeking to provide investors with adequate redress. The issue
presented was whether an implied right of action should be recognized
under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14a-9.
Rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of proxies that contain any materially
false or misleading statement. 15 Answering this inquiry in the affirmative,
the Court relied on Section 14(a)'s legislative history as well as that statute's "broad remedial purposes."'1 6 Focusing on the underlying objective
of the proxy regimen, the Court opined: "While [Section 14(a)'s] language makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its
8. 328 U.S. at 299. Decided the year that Professor Bromberg authored his seminal
treatise, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), likewise provided a broad construction (stating that "remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes").
9. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
10. Section 4(2) (now Section 4(a)(2)) of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts from the
Securities Act's registration requirements "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
11. 346 U.S. at 124.
12. Id. at 124-27.
13. Id. As interpreted by lower federal courts, Ralston Purina signifies that an individual's monetary wealth is not equivalent to financial sophistication. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977). Nonetheless, in adopting
Regulation D, which provides a safe harbor for the Section 4(a)(2) statutory exemption,
the SEC has deemed having a specified net worth or annual income as sufficient to qualify
an investor as financially sophisticated. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), .505, .506 of Regulation D; Securities Act Release No. 6389 (1982). For an article criticizing the SEC's approach as being contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate in Ralston Purina,see Marc I.
Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Administrative, Enforcement, and
Legislative Programs and Policies-TheirInfluence on CorporateInternal Affairs, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 173, 209-14 (1982).
14. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. Section 14(a) is the statute upon which Rule 14a-9 is based.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
16. 377 U.S. at 431.
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chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the7
availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result.'
Going further, and invoking a pure policy rationale, the Court also
opined that recognition of this implied private right of action provides a
18
necessary supplement to the SEC's enforcement practices.
It was with this Supreme Court precedent in focus that Professor
Bromberg authored his seminal treatise in 1967. The language and tenor
of these decisions portray a Supreme Court receptive to interpreting the
federal securities laws in a broad manner to effectuate investor protection. With respect to the lower federal courts, litigation was proceeding
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a private right of action under
these provisions had been recognized two decades earlierY9
Three years after Professor Bromberg's Rule 10b-5 treatise was published, the Supreme Court handed down Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.20
which was a continuation of the investor-friendly approach of its earlier
decisions. In that decision, construing Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, the
Supreme Court in effect dispensed with requiring a plaintiff to prove loss
causation. The Court held that once "there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship
between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if ...he
proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect
in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction. '2 1 The Court's decision may have signaled that the
federal securities laws would continue to be interpreted in a manner
favorable to investors.
Five years after Mills was decided, the landscape suddenly changed. No
longer was securities litigation viewed by the Supreme Court as protec17. Id. at 432. The era in which Borak was handed down has been called by Professor
Loss as the Court's "ebullient stage" for implying private rights of action. See Louis Loss,
Fundamentalsof Securities Regulation 926 (2d ed. 1988).
18. 377 U.S. at 432; see 2 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 5:148-5:274; 5 BROMBERG,
supra note 4, §§ 7:96-7:102.
19. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). This longstanding judicial recognition of an implied private right of action under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 prompted the Supreme Court to remark that "[t]he existence of this implied
remedy is simply beyond peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
380 (1983).
20. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
21. Id. at 385. Today, in view of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
plaintiffs invoking Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 must prove loss causation. See Section
21D(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4). In Mills, the minority
shareholders had sufficient votes to affect whether the merger would be approved. The
Court left open the issue whether the requisite showing of causation can be shown when
insiders controlled the merger's approval (without needing the votes of the minority shareholders). Id. at 385 n.7, 386. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding that minority shareholders in this situation could satisfy the causation
requirement). For commentary on this issue, see Marc I. Steinberg and William A. Reece,
The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action, and Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 67,
101-12 (1993). For another investor-friendly decision during this era, see Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (holding that the presence of a duty to disclose and the nondisclosure of a material fact can show causation in fact).
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tive of investor interests but as raising the specter of facilitating the filing
of "vexatious" or "strike" actions. 22 With some key exceptions where the
Supreme Court has ruled in favor of investor interests, 23 the Court's decisions have significantly narrowed the scope of the24federal securities laws,
and, in particular, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

In rapid succession, the Supreme Court, reversing
below, confined the reach of Section 10(b) and Rule
Stamps,25 decided in 1975, the Court held that the
purchaser or seller of the subject securities in order

the appellate courts
10b-5. In Blue Chip
plaintiff must be a
to have standing to

sue for damages under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 26 Accordingly,

those investors who elect to hold their securities after receiving false
"rosy" financial information knowingly disseminated by insiders have no
27
federal securities law private remedy.
A year later, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder28 was decided, holding that
plaintiffs, in private actions instituted for violation of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, must prove a defendant's scienter (i.e., knowing or intentional misconduct). 29 Reversing the Seventh Circuit, which held that negligence was the requisite culpability level, 30 the Court focused on Section
10(b)'s language, legislative history, and its relationship to the express
civil remedies of the federal securities laws. 3 1 Concluding, the Court held:
"[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history
reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the
scope of the statute to negligent conduct. '32 Four years later, the Su22. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-41 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (upholding the fraud on the market theory under § 10(b)); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389
(2004) (holding a contractual entitlement to a fixed rate of return satisfies the expectation
of profit prong of the Howey test); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (recognizing
the fraud on the market theory to create a rebuttable presumption of reliance under
§ 10(b)); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (adopting a cumulative
construction of remedies under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and § 11 of the
Securities Act); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (holding that § 17(a)(1) of
the Securities Act extends to secondary market trading).
24. See discussion infra notes 25-67 and accompanying text.
25. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723.
26. Id. at 733-55 (reversing 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973)). Professor Bromberg's treatise is cited in the Court's opinion. See 421 U.S. at 729, 735, 752 n.15.
27. As the Court recognized, among the plaintiffs barred from bringing a Section
10(b) action due to lack of standing "are actual shareholders in the issuer who allege that
they decided not to sell their shares because of an unduly rosy representation or a failure
to disclose unfavorable material." 421 U.S. at 737-38.
28. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
29. Id. at 197-215.
30. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
31. 425 U.S. at 194-214.
32. Id. at 214. In both Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder, Justice Blackmun vigorously
dissented. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 761-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[By]
grav[ing] into stone Birnbaum's arbitrary principle of standing . . . the Court exhibits a
preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a seeming callousness toward the
investing public quite out of keeping, it seems to me, with our own traditions and the intent
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preme Court, placing emphasis on Section 10(b)'s statutory language and
its plain meaning, extended its holding in Hochfelder to the SEC.33 In so
ruling, the Court rejected the Commission's assertion that, as the statuit need only prove the defendant's
tory guardian of the investing public, 34
negligence in its enforcement actions.
A year later, in Santa Fe,35 the Supreme Court, reversing the Second
Circuit, 36 held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not encompass constructive fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, a disclosure deficiency, such as a misrepresentation, must be shown. 37 The Court's
decision was not surprising given its holdings a short time before in Blue
Chip Stamps and Hochfelder. The practical impact of the decision was to
foreclose the strategy developed by the plaintiffs' bar to invoke Section
10(b) to redress corporate self-dealing and internal corporate mismanagement, thereby seeking the application of federal standards to normative fiduciary behavior. 38 This effort to employ Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 as a means to implement a federal corporation law was thoroughly
39
rejected by the Supreme Court.
During that time period, the Supreme Court also was active in restricting the implication of private rights of action. The Court's decision in
Borak,40 decided just a decade earlier, was the product of a bygone era.
The broad construction to implied private rights of action abruptly halted
with the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash. 41 There, the Court
enunciated a four-prong standard 42 in ascertaining whether Congress inof the securities laws."); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the majority has interpreted § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "restrictively and narrowly and
thereby stultifies recovery for the victim").
33. Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (holding, inter
alia, that scienter must be proven by the SEC in its enforcement actions for violation of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
34. Id. at 691 ("In our view, the rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of
the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.") See 5 BROMBERG, supra
note 4, §§ 7:125-7:212.
35. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
36. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
37. 430 U.S. at 471-80. Justice Brennan was the lone dissenter; see id. at 480 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
38. See Ralph C. Ferrara and Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5
and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
39. 430 U. S. at 477-80. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (recommending the implementation
of comprehensive federal fiduciary standards).
40. See discussion supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
41. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
42. Id. at 78:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally rele-
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tended to create a private remedy. 43 Subsequent decisions further narrowed Cort's inquiry by focusing on statutory construction as the key
determinant for whether a private right of action should be implied.44 As
currently occurs
a consequence, the implication of private rights of action
45
with far less frequency than during the Borak era.

The foregoing discussion provides a succinct analysis of the state of
private securities litigation and, in particular, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 at the time that I joined the SMU faculty in 1989. During the 1990s to
the present, the Supreme Court has continued to apply a restrictive interpretation to the scope of the Section 10(b) private right of action. In 1991,
the Court, rejecting the doctrine of equitable tolling, adopted a one year/
three year statute of limitations for Section 10(b) claims 46 that was subse-

its enactment of a longer statute of
quently nullified by Congress with
47
limitations (two year/five year).
In my discussions with Alan in the aftermath of Supreme Court decisions, no decision stands out more in my memory than Central Bank of
Denver,48 decided in 1994. Prior to that decision, for several decades, aiders and abettors were within the Section 10(b) liability net. As Justice
Stevens observed in his CentralBank dissent: "In hundreds of judicial and
administrative proceedings in every circuit in the federal system, the
courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject
gated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
43. Id. at 77-85; see California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (stating ihat the
four-prong standard specified in Cort remains the criteria through which to ascertain
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action).
44. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979) ("The
question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is
basically a matter of statutory construction.").
45. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) ("The rule that
has emerged in the years since Borak and Mills came down is that recognition of any
private right of action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congressional
intent to provide a private remedy."); Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that no implied right of action exists under specified provisions of the Investment Company Act); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990) (joining overwhelming view of appellate courts in holding that § 17(a) of the Securities Act does not provide a
private right of action); Bennett v. United States Tr. Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding that no implied private right of action exists under § 7 of the Securities
Exchange Act). For further discussion, see 1 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 2:54-2:101; Marc
I. Steinberg, Securities Regulation: Liabilities and Remedies § 9.03 (2014).
46. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)
(holding that the applicable statute of limitations for private actions under §10(b) is one
year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation within a three-year period of
repose); see 6 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 10:40-10:74.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, provides
that "a private right of action that ... involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws ...
may be brought not later than the earlier of - (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation." See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (construing the two-year discovery language of § 1658(b) and
holding that this period begins when a reasonably diligent person knows or should know of
the facts constituting the violation, including the fact of the subject defendant's scienter).
48. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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to liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." '49 In a five to four decision, the
Court, applying a strict statutory construction, rejected that view, stating:
"Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b)." 50
Although not totally unexpected, the result in Central Bank was surprising to many practitioners and academicians. Indeed, the petitioner
had conceded that aiding and abetting liability existed under Section
10(b) and had sought Supreme Court review, inter alia, on whether it
could be held liable on the basis of recklessness rather than actual knowledge. 5 1 Instead of addressing these issues, the Court sua sponte ordered
of the propriety of aiding and abetting
the parties to address the question
52
liability under Section 10(b).
The extent to which the Supreme Court confined the scope of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 within two decades after its decision in
Hochfelder5 3 is shown by the fact that the plaintiffs in Hochfelder would
not have been able to even institute that case two decades later due to
two reasons. First, the statute of limitations would have run under the one
year/three year time period adopted in Lampf,54 and, second, the defendant accounting firm was sued as an aider and abettor, and, hence, would
55
not have been subject to private liability after Central Bank.
In the aftermath of Central Bank, the predominant issue was the primary liability exposure under Section 10(b) for collateral actors, such as
attorneys, bankers, and consultants. In two subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court further confined the scope of Section 10(b) primary liability.
In the first case, Stoneridge Investment PartnersLLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc.,56 the Court under the facts alleged rejected the imposition of
"scheme" liability against the subject defendants. Because the investing
public did not have knowledge of the alleged illegal transactions engaged
in by the defendants, the requisite element of reliance could not be
49. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 191. The Court's holding likely signified that the SEC as well could not bring
enforcement actions against those persons who aided and abetted Section 10(b) violations.
Congress resolved this issue by subsequently granting the Commission authority to pursue
aiders and abettors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e), Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
(enacted pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
51. 511 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, in this case, petitioner assumed
the existence of a right of action against aiders and abettors, and sought review only of the
subsidiary questions whether an indenture trustee could be found liable as an aider and
abettor absent a breach of an indenture agreement or other duty under state law, and
whether it could be liable as an aider and abettor based only on a showing of
recklessness.").
52. Id.; see 5 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 7:298-7:332.
53. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), discussed supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
54. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), discussed supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
55. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994),
discussed supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
56. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
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shown. Accordingly, the Court reasoned, "[n]o member of the investing
public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents' deceptive acts during the relevant times [and that] as a result, [plaintiffs] cannot
show reliance upon any of respondents' actions except in an indirect
chain that we find too remote for liability. '57 In rejecting the position
held by a number of lower federal courts that the entering into by financial institutions and others of deceptive transactions as part of a scheme
was within the scope of Section 10(b) primary conduct, 58 the Supreme
Court's holding signifies that persons who "behind the scenes" orchestrate a fraudulent scheme, where their actions are59unknown to investors,
are insulated from Section 10(b) private liability.
The second decision, Janus Capital,60 focused on the reach of Rule 10b5(b) primary liability. That provision prohibits the making of material
misrepresentations or half-truths in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. 61 As viewed by the SEC and a number of lower courts,
persons (such as attorneys) who drafted disclosure documents or who
otherwise meaningfully participated in preparing the subject documents
were "co-creators" and thereby within the reach of primary Section 10(b)
liability exposure for materially false statements contained in such
62
documents.
Defining the word "make" in a restrictive manner, the majority in Janus Capital held that "the maker of a statement is the person or entity
with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it." 63 Without such authority, the
Court reasoned, one can "merely suggest" the contents of a statement,
not in fact make the statement. 64 Accordingly, without attribution of the
57. Id. at 159.
58. See, e.g., In re Enron Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549
(S.D. Tex. 2002); In re Enron Securities Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 439 F. Supp. 2d
692 (S.D. Tex. 2006), rev'd 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); see also, 552 U.S. at 175 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("I respectfully dissent from the Court's continuing campaign to render the
private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless.").
59. For a critical assessment of the Court's decision, see, for example, Mark Klock,
What Will It Take to Label Participationin a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The DisastrousResult and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 309 (2010).
60. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296 (2011).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (prohibiting, in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading").
62. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that "when
a non-employee consultant causes misstatements or omissions within periodic financial reports [to be] submitted to the Commission, knowing that those misstatements or omissions
will reach investors, he can be held primarily liable under the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws"); Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in Klein v. Boyd, at 15, Nos. 971143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. 1998) (asserting that "a person who has the requisite scienter can be
held liable as a primary violator of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 thereunder when he or she, acting alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation,
whether or not the person is identified with the misrepresentation by name").
63. 131 S.Ct. at 2302.
64. Id.
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statement to a collateral actor, the preparation, publication or drafting of
a statement on another's behalf does not constitute the "making" of such
statement by such collateral actor. 65 The consequence of the Court's confining decision may well be that Section 10(b) primary liability is foreclosed with respect to those fraudsters who knowingly draft, advise, or
otherwise integrally participate in the communication of outright lies to
the investing public. 66 As Justice Breyer wrote for the four-member dissent: "[W]here can the majority find legal support for the rule that it
enunciates? . . .I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule lOb-5, its language, its history, or its precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting
a loophole of the kind that the majority's
the securities laws, intended
'67
rule may well create."
Particularly with the trilogy of Central Bank, Stoneridge, and Janus
Capital,68 Alan expressed his disappointment with the Court's decisions
that greatly confine Rule 10b-5's reach. By overruling decades of lower
court precedent, applying unduly strict statutory construction, invoking
wooden definitional terminology, and/or policy considerations directed at
the danger of vexatious litigation, the Court has succeeded in significantly
narrowing the scope of this vital right of action. Although far from a
plaintiff's advocate, Alan lamented that these decisions unduly immunized bad actors from monetary liability at the expense of aggrieved
investors. 69
Section 10(b)'s continued vigor also has been challenged by Congress
and, in particular, by the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 70 In addition to "reforming" the institu65. Id. (recognizing that attribution of a statement (either expressly or implicitly from
the surrounding facts and circumstances) constitutes "strong evidence" that such statement
was made by the collateral actor to whom it is attributed).
66. The SEC takes the position that the drafter may be primarily liable under Rule
10b-5(a) or (c). See In re John P. Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *13 (SEC Dec. 15, 2014)
("Accepting that a drafter is not primarily liable for 'making' a misstatement under Rule
10b-5(b), our position is that the drafter would be primarily liable under subsections (a)
and (c) for employing a deceptive 'device' and engaging in a deceptive 'act."'). Thus far,
the courts have disagreed with the SEC. See, e.g., WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v.
Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2011) (and cases cited therein).
dissenting). For commentary on Janus Capital,
67. 131 S. Ct. at 2307, 2311 (Breyer, J.,
see, for example, 5 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 7:298-7:306.59; Marc I. Steinberg, Understanding Securities Law 340-42 (6th ed. 2014).
68. See discussion supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
69. The Supreme Court decisions addressed in this article serve as key examples of the
Court's restrictive approach to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Several other narrow decisions, not discussed in the text of this article due to space limitations, also illustrate this
restrictive approach. For example, in the insider trading area, the Supreme Court adopted
a rationale based on state law concepts of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). As a more recent example,
overruling the approach undertaken by the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court held
that Section 10(b) reaches only those transactions where the purchase or sale of a security
is made in the United States or such purchase or sale involves a security listed on a U.S.
exchange. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269-70 (2010). Congress
has sought to nullify Morrison with respect to its application to government enforcement
actions. See Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(c), 78aa(b)).
70. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
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tion, undertaking, and settlement of securities class actions, 71 this legislation directly impacts the scope of Section 10(b) in private litigation in two
key ways: first, by enhancing the pleading fraud with particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 72 and,
second, by insulating forward-looking statements made by publicly-held
companies from being actionable unless made with actual knowledge of
their falsity (and further, if such statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary disclosure, then deeming such statements to be not actionable as a matter of law). 73 This legislation provides defendants with
further avenues to seek and frequently obtain dismissal of lawsuits alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 at an early stage of the
74
litigation.
The "road" that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have taken since Professor Bromberg authored his seminal treatise in 1967 frequently has been
arduous. Although this right of action remains as the principal provision
invoked by securities class action plaintiffs, many hurdles must be traversed. I believe that Professor Bromberg felt that many of these obstacles
were well-placed, such as the Blue Chip standing requirement, the
Hochfelder scienter standard, and the Santa Fe mandate that a disclosure
deficiency must be shown. On the contrary, Professor Bromberg, in my
opinion, believed that certain other Supreme Court decisions were poorly
reasoned and made bad public policy. Among these decisions is Central
Bank of Denver that foreclosed aiding and abetting liability in Section
10(b) private actions as well as the Stoneridge and Janus Capitaldecisions
that further restricted aggrieved plaintiffs in their quest to seek relief
75
against collateral actors.
Professor Alan R. Bromberg had an illustrious academic career. For
half a century, he was one of the preeminent scholars in the world in the
business enterprises and securities law fields. He also was an exceptional
71. These reforms are aptly described in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference (1995).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), Section 21D(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, enacted
pursuant to the PSLRA, construed in, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 321 (2007) ("Under the PSLRA's heightened pleading instructions, any private securities complaint alleging that the defendant made a false or misleading statement must: (1)
'specify each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading,' and (2) 'state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind'...." (quoting § 78u4(b))).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2, Section 27A of the Securities Act; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5, Section
21E of the Securities Exchange Act. See Asher v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729 (7th
Cir. 2004) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i)) ("The statutory safe harbor forecloses
liability [regardless of the defendant's state of mind] if a forward-looking statement 'is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement'").
Accord Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F. 3d 758, 769, 773 (2d Cir. 2010).
74. See Marc I. Steinberg, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims-Only Part of the Story, 45
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 606 (2014) (stating that statistics show that securities class actions
are regularly dismissed by federal district courts and that in 2012 47% of motions to dismiss were granted).
75. See 5 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 7:298-7:332.
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person, with kindness, humility, loyalty, courtesy, and empathy among his
many attributes. I was fortunate to have him as my good friend. I thank
you and miss you Alan.

